

Ref. T2/13.01

PASSENGER FERRY SECURITY

1 At its sixty-sixth session (MSC 66/24, paragraph 23.3), the Maritime Safety Committee amended and approved a paper prepared by a correspondence group on ferry security (MSC 66/23), the text of which is attached hereto.

2 The measures in this document are for consideration primarily in respect of passenger ferries operating on international routes and the ports serving those routes. However, the measures may also be applied to international freight ferry operations depending on the requirements of individual Member Governments.

ANNEX

PASSENGER FERRY SECURITY

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 MSC Circular 443 supported security measures for passenger ships engaged on international voyages of 24 hours or more. Based on the views expressed by Member Governments during the IMO Ferry Security Seminar held in November 1993, MSC 63 agreed with the proposal by the UK that IMO should consider the recommendation of similar voluntary measures for international passenger ferries and ports. It was further agreed that any measures to be considered should be based on the following key points:

- 1.1.1 any measures and procedures implemented by Member Governments would be voluntary and should reflect the local current assessment of the likely threat together with local conditions and circumstances.
- 1.1.2 the need to apply these measures to the carriage of vehicles and other matters particular to ferry traffic.
- 1.1.3 that Member Governments should where appropriate, utilising the framework of IMO circulars, produce cohesive measures covering their international ferry routes which are complementary to other Member Governments' measures; thereby avoiding conflicting demands being placed on ferry operators.
- 1.1.4 that within the framework of the above principles, Member Governments should, if possible, seek to harmonise their measures in order to reduce the number of differing requirements laid on ferry operators who serve ports in several States.

1.2 MSC 63 established a Correspondence Group to consider and recommend appropriate measures. It is the view of the Correspondence Group that in order to encompass these key principles any security recommendations for passenger ferries and ports made to MSC should be on the basis that:

- 1.2.1 security provisions put in place by Member Governments for ferries and ferry ports should not depart from the basic principles and general provisions established by IMO for cruise ships and ports in MSC/Circ.443.
- 1.2.2 to avoid conflicting demands being placed on ferry operators serving ports in several countries, and to enable the effective harmonisation of Member Governments security measures, this should ideally be achieved by means of a memorandum of understanding or some other form of cooperative or bi-lateral agreement between the relevant States.

2 SCOPE OF MEASURES

2.1 The measures in this document are for consideration primarily in respect of passenger ferries operating on international routes and the ports serving those routes. However, the measures may also be applied to international freight ferry operations depending on the requirements of individual Member Governments.

3 DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES

3.1 For the purpose of these measures the definitions provided in MSC/Circ.443 (MSC 53/24, annex 14) will apply. The measures outlined in this document should be read in conjunction with the security measures and procedures detailed in MSC/Circ.443.

4 LEVELS OF THREAT

4.1 As part of bi-lateral agreements Member Governments may wish to agree a system of threat level notification covering background, moderate and high levels of threat and the security measures each considers appropriate to these levels.

5 APPLICATION OF MEASURES

5.1 Member Governments may wish to consider whether existing national legislation, regulations and guidance require review to enable the implementation of security measures as a result of this document, or bi-lateral agreements with other Governments. It is desirable that there should be appropriate legislation or regulations which, *inter alia*, could provide penalties for persons committing unlawful acts against passengers or crews on board ships.

5.2 Member Governments should identify a national authority to coordinate and monitor the implementation of security measures. The designated authority should coordinate with other relevant domestic agencies to ensure that specific roles and functions of other agencies and departments are agreed and implemented. Details of the national authority so identified should be notified to the Secretary-General of IMO who should make available such details to other Member States on request.

5.3 Member Governments should keep each other fully informed of any information relevant to the implementation of security measures on passenger ferry routes and sufficient to allow both parties to consider the form of any bi-lateral security agreements, also advising their ferry and port operators where appropriate. This will apply in particular to information on the local assessment of threat which a Member Government considers may justify enhanced security measures at the other end of a route. Member Governments should consult each other with an intention of agreeing the level of threat on a passenger ferry route and the specific measures to be implemented.

5.4 In the process of implementing security measures, all efforts should be made to avoid undue interference with passenger services and take into account applicable international conventions.

5.5 The need to apply these security measures to the carriage of vehicles is likely to require an increased emphasis in the role of the port facility authority, particularly in the provision of facilities and resources for higher threat level measures such as searching. In addition the control of vehicle traffic and its security screening at higher threat levels, will need to be considered in port facility security plans, contingency planning and the training of security staff.

5.6 In accordance with the general principles of protective security described in MSC/Circ.443 certain measures will be necessary to provide a basic "background" level of protection for passenger ferry services. These measures are:

5.6.1 **The appointment of port facility security officers and ship security officers.** International passenger ferries and ferry ports should have responsible persons appointed and trained to perform the appropriate security duties outlined in MSC/Circ.443.

5.6.2 **Contingency plans.** Port facility and ship security plans should be developed allowing for a greater level of security measures in response to an increased threat and action in the event of specific emergency situations.

5.6.3 **Provision of information.** Arrangements should be put in hand whereby ports and shipping companies are required to provide the national authorities responsible for maritime security, with information concerning passenger ferry services, and the names and contact details of port facility and ship security officers and their deputies.

5.6.4 **Control of embarkations and disembarkations.** Movements of passengers and their baggage should be properly controlled to prevent unauthorised access to ships from the port area, and to minimise the risk of unauthorised weapons or explosives being carried aboard. Passengers should also be prevented from leaving a ship after embarkation without a valid reason.

5.6.5 **Security Liaison Committees.** Committees should be established to include port facility security officers, shipping company and government control authority representatives and other relevant persons, to coordinate security measures and contingency planning in passenger ferry ports.

5.6.6 **Liaison to limit terrorists using ferries to move arms etc.** Ships as a means of transport, can be used as an innocent conduit for the movement of arms consignments etc for terrorist groups. Although such consignments may pose little or no immediate threat to the ferry or its passengers, Member Governments should work with ferry operators to identify ways to minimise such traffic.

5.7 For heightened threat levels the following on-scene security measures should be considered, as appropriate to local conditions and circumstances, and where appropriate forming part of any bi-lateral agreement between Member States:

5.7.1 **Restricted areas.** The establishment of restricted areas around foot and vehicle passenger areas and ships berths allows much greater control to be exercised over access. Restricted areas should be clearly defined and where necessary effectively secured by means of security barriers and/or personnel, which may be supported by security lighting, CCTV alarms and any other appropriate means of access control.

5.7.2 **Access control and identification.** Persons and their property, before being allowed to pass beyond access points, should be subject to routine inspection and monitoring, or both. Reconciliation of passengers and their baggage should be considered. At higher threat levels an effective pass system should be introduced to identify more easily authorised personnel whose duties require them to pass through access points. Passengers should be allowed through recognised channels only and subject to security controls. Access to the ship should also be closely controlled. Crew members should carry photopasses and the identity of visitors should be closely checked.

5.7.3 **Searching/screening of passengers, their vehicles and baggage etc.** All items to be taken aboard passenger ferries should be subject to inspection, at a level appropriate to the risk of unlawful acts against passengers and crew aboard ships. At higher threat levels security searching/screening should be at increasing levels of intensity and sufficient resources of trained staff, equipment and facilities must be available.

5.7.4 **Restricted areas on board ships.** The establishment of restricted areas to control access to key areas on board ships (eg bridge, engine room, steering gear) is recommended. This can be achieved through the use of technical devices - although due care must be taken to ensure safety is not compromised - or by allocated personnel.
