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Public policies to 'develop' fisheries are at
times still understood as policies simply aimed at
increasing the volume - and therefore the value -
of production. This understanding of public
policies rests on the idea that 'development' of
the sector is needed in order to make it a larger,
or more reliable, source of livelihood. Livelihood
is then understood to be a satisfactory manner of
earning a living, of obtaining adequate income.
Often, the poorer the economy, the greater the
tendency to consider 'development' as synonymous
with 'economic growth'.
However, in most commercial fisheries a strategy
aiming to expand the volume of landings is no
longer a valid option. Thus, among those
responsible for establishing public policies
towards fisheries, the view that development must
incorporate effective management is now generally
accepted. There is little debate about the
affirmation that, in the long-term, sustainable
development of both capture fisheries and
aquaculture will only be achieved if effective
management accompanies development efforts.
If using the term 'development' means a sequence
of events that leads to a sustainable improvement
in incomes, then the practices used in capture
fisheries, aquaculture, post-harvest activities and
trade as a result of 'development' must be socially
and environmentally acceptable. To ensure these
sustainability conditions, 'development' is then
seen as including 'management'. Therefore,
government policies intended to promote development
in the fisheries sector should also include
provisions intending to ensure that the ensuing
activities can be successfully managed. The need to
manage is common to capture fisheries and
aquaculture and to some aspects of post-harvest
activities and trade - but, in capture fisheries
the need is largest.
Until very recently fishing was considered the
right of all - and fishery administrations treated
the activity as such: i.e. access was open to all.
In the past this made sense as the amount of wild
stocks per fisher was much larger than today - not
only because there were fewer fishers who were on
average much less effective - but also because the
resource was 'hidden'. Although open access today
is not in the interest of the majority, the
majority has difficulty accepting this view,
creating difficulties for development.
Indicators of sustainable development
Public development efforts are hindered by the
possibility that they contribute to additional
fishing effort. In fact, this difficulty exists
even in fisheries where the principle of restrained
access has been accepted. Management is costly and
complicated to implement even where all
stakeholders agree that management is required. It
is complicated in the sense that for each fishery
there is a need for agreed and practical procedures
for monitoring and control of effort. Consequently,
a growing attempt - partly by FAO - is now being
dedicated to develop indicators of sustainable
development that are consistent with the
precautionary approach and applicable in marine
capture fisheries.
Today, the need to ensure management of capture
fisheries in order to promote their development is
reflected in several public policies:
- the use of a property rights framework for
managing capture fisheries and aquaculture;
- the application of the precautionary
principle to fisheries management; and,
- an the use of an ecosystem framework for
management of capture fisheries.
These policies are finding a growing, worldwide
application by national fishery
administrations.
An expanding world population has meant that in
recent decades there has been an increasing
competition among fishers for access to resources
as well as a gradual invasion of non-fisher users.
This has affected fishers of all types in addition
to those part-time aquaculturists who have
practised extensive forms of aquaculture in coastal
areas. There has been a growing need for fishers to
learn how to share natural resources with other
users while they simultaneously strive to develop
their activities. In capture fisheries this has
often been done under the heading of "integrating
fisheries into coastal area management'. In inland
fisheries and aquaculture it has lead to clear
principles for the multiple use of inland water
bodies and for the development and use of
inland watersheds.
Long-term development strategies
The long-term strategies for development of any
fishery are very influenced by the relationship
between fishing capacity and resource availability.
Three types of situations can be distinguished: the
fishing effort is either larger than (excess
capacity), about equal to, or inferior to, the
volume of landings/production that the wild stocks
can yield sustainably. Long-term development
strategies are also influenced by the degree of
economic well-being of the economy within which the
fishery operates and by the rate of economic growth
in that same economy.
Quite naturally, governments are most concerned
when fisheries experience excess capacity.
Unfortunately a large number of fisheries find
themselves in this situation, and the number seems
to be rising steadily at the beginning of the 21st
century. Thus, from the perspective of the public
sector, the question of management has become more
important than 'development'. In 1995 a large
number of governments, with the support of the
fishing industry and several non-governmental
organizations, agreed to the FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries. The Code addresses
management of both capture fisheries and
aquaculture and asserts the need for a
precautionary approach in management and
development of fisheries.
In rich developed economies, the excess capacity
situation has led to policies aimed at strict
control access, and thereby effort. There is a
trend towards strengthening fishers rights by
introducing quota schemes (effectively control
access and effort) in fisheries that lend
themselves to such management. But not all capture
fisheries are amenable to a rapid introduction of
this form of management. It is easier to introduce
licensing schemes whereby gradually only licensed
vessels are allowed to fish. Also, replacement of
vessels are increasingly permitted only under
conditions intended to ensure that technological
improvements do not cause growing capacity in the
fleet as a whole. Where capacity excess is very
large, fishery administrations tend to resort to
vessel buy-back schemes and, if the collapse is
drastic, to unemployment and social security
payments. Where possible, unemployed fishers are
enrolled in vocational training schemes aimed at
permanently moving them out of fisheries.
Some of the long-distance fishing nations
support their industries by negotiating access to
foreign fishing zones, while some vessel owners
obtain such access through private joint-venture
schemes. Long-distance fishing nations and nations
with important fisheries on straddling stocks
usually are keen participants in Regional
Fishery Bodies or Arrangements, as the
management schemes agreed in these bodies favour
the fishing fleets of those economies that are
members of these bodies, and often de facto makes
fishing difficult for those who are not. The
administrations in these countries are also those
who argue in favour of rapid implementation of
international instruments addressing high-sea
fishing issues such as the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement and the Compliance
Agreement.
But, even when fleet capacity is in harmony with
the exploitable levels of wild fish stocks
governments in rich developed economies have to
deal with the prospects of excess capacity and with
the issue of how to generate more economic
well-being from the fishery sector. Attempting to
capture more of the value-added in processing and
sales of fish and fish products can do the latter.
However, this strategy favours national fishers
only as long as they are the main suppliers to the
national market. When demand in processing plants
exceed supply from local fishers, the need to
ensure imports of cheap raw material may not be in
the economic interests of the local fishers. In
fact, when national demand for fish is far in
excess of the supply by the national industry,
consumers' demand for cheap products may make it
difficult for the local capture and processing
industry to compete. Japan seems to have been
facing this situation for some time.
In countries where fisheries both contribute a
significant share of the national economy and
supply a large part of the production to foreign
markets, national administrations often will aim to
ensure that competition by other producers in
foreign markets take place on terms that are fair
and equitable.
In poor, developing countries, the excess
fishing capacity is more a problem of labour than
of capital. This means that the total fishing
effort is the combined work of a large number of
individual fishers. In such situations, any
significant reduction of fishing effort will
necessarily translate into less fishing for many
fishers. This creates a large social problem as
many fishers live at the edge of subsistence.
The problem is also practical. Most fishery
administrations in poor, developing countries have
few real means by which to control access.
Licensing for the purpose of permitting fishing -
as opposed to raising revenue - is seldom possible
in artisanal or traditional fisheries. Forcibly
excluding fishers - or their heirs - from fishing
in many cases would jeopardise the livelihood of
the individuals concerned and their families. A
common policy designed to help artisanal and
small-scale fisherfolk is to reserve the coastal
area exclusively for them. However, few fishery
administrations have MCS equipment needed to keep
industrial vessels out of a zone reserved for
artisanal fishers. International technical
assistance to capture fisheries in poor regions is
increasingly taking the livelihoods approach which
aims to improve the effectiveness not only of the
activities of fishing communities, but also of the
public policies, institutions and processes that
affect the livelihood of fishing communities.
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