The role of regional fishery bodies in
conservation and management of resources
The nature and role of RFBs
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
provides only a few references to the subject of
"regional cooperation" in the context of fisheries
management. In comparison, the later instruments
provide an increasing number of references to, and
a progressively important role for, RFBs, in
the conservation and management of fish stocks. In
fact, RFBs should now be viewed as critical to the
realization of sustainable utilization of world
marine capture fisheries.
From the terminology used in the post 1982
Convention instruments, it is important to
distinguish between an onus for conservation and
management being placed upon the States which
comprise RFBs, and the RFBs themselves. It must be
recalled that RFBs are not supra-national. They are
only as strong and effective as their Members make
them. In spite of this fact, many Governments have
proven slow to tackle the issue of fisheries
reform. There are two main reasons for this:
benefits are slow to appear and do so only after
considerable costs have been incurred for some
time; and individuals who incur the costs are
seldom convinced that they will reap the benefits,
and so they resist what they perceive to be a
re-distribution of their income.
An examination of the contemporary role and
efficiency of RFBs based on correspondence received
directly from the RFBs, their annual reports, FAO
publications, and other relevant publications has
led to the following conclusions regarding their
role and nature.
Cooperation: a division between wealthy,
developed States and a majority of less wealthy
developing States marks Current international
relations. International cooperation is therefore
needed to address inequities and fulfil the
provisions of the world order envisaged by
international agreements such as the Charter of the
United Nations, the 1982 Convention, and the
subsequent international fisheries instruments
reviewed. RFBs can play a significant role in
pursuing regional cooperation for these purposes,
and in particular for cooperation in the
conservation and management of marine capture
fisheries.
Incongruent Fisheries Interest of Contracting
Parties: Despite this notion of cooperation,
within many RFBs there is a conflict of interest
among contracting parties which very often leads to
an inability to agree on the parameters necessary
for management. For example, many RFBs contain both
developed and developing States, coastal States,
distant water fishing States, and coastal States
with an interest in becoming more active high seas
fishing States. For some contracting parties,
fisheries constitute a vital economic interest,
while for other States, they constitute a middle or
low-level economic interest. Such diversity results
in varied commitments, levels of participation, and
expectations regarding the objectives of the RFBs.
All States can potentially contribute, be it
financially, intellectually, ideologically, or
politically to the work of a RFB and it must be
remembered that the diversity of contracting
parties underpins the notion of the need for
cooperation.
Management: Funding difficulties prevent
greater contracting party participation in many RFB
programmes, and such constraints severely weaken
the ability of some secretariats to function
effectively. Furthermore, according to the relevant
mandate given to each RFB, many are empowered to
make only advisory recommendations concerning
conservation and management. Consequently they are
unable to regulate the fishing activities of
contracting parties.
Political Will: The effectiveness of many
RFBs is further undermined by the failure of
members to accept and/or implement those
international instruments described above which are
central to the better conservation and management
of world marine capture fisheries. Until and unless
the issue of enhancing political commitment to the
implementation of the legal regime, and
conservation and management measures is addressed,
the expectation of strengthening the role of RFBs
is unlikely to be realized.
Conclusion
The international community, by means of the
post-1982 fishery instruments, has opted to give an
increasingly important role to RFBs for the
management and conservation of world marine capture
fisheries. Despite frequently operating in adverse
circumstances due to inadequate mandates or terms
of reference, incongruent fishery interests of
members, funding and staffing difficulties, and
lack of political commitment by members, RFBs play
a primary role in the sustainable utilization of
fisheries by means of facilitating regional
cooperation. However, more substantial attention
must be given to the implementation of the
post-1982 fishery instruments which clearly
envisage a more proactive role for RFBs in the
conservation and management of fisheries.
A review of information provided by RFBs shows
that very few bodies have started to implement the
conservation and management measures provided for
in the post-1982 fishery instruments. This
conclusion is perhaps not surprising. The
instruments present complex scientific, managerial
and political considerations that cannot be
resolved quickly.
The result of this state of affairs is that
despite international expectations for RFBs to take
effective measures to conserve and manage marine
capture fisheries, there is little facility for
this to occur unless their roles and functions are
strengthened as presented in these fishery
instruments. The deficiencies apparent with
regional fisheries management must be addressed in
a more comprehensive and rational manner if
sustainable utilization is to be achieved. This is
important because under existing international law,
and within the current paradigm for the management
of straddling, highly migratory and high seas fish
stocks, RFBs provide the only realistic mechanism
for the enhanced international cooperation in their
conservation and management.
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